How the MOD Waste's our Billions

[vRS Carl]

Dispatches tonight at 8pm Channel 4

Being in the Forces myself, along with a few other members on here, (and knowing exactly how they fcuk up procurement etc) i shall be watching this.

Synopsis of the Programme

War correspondent Sam Kiley questions whether British taxpayers and soldiers are being offered value for money by the Ministry of Defence. The presenter argues that despite a defence budget that is one of the top four in the world, a series of poor decisions made by the department means that it has failed both the public and those serving on the front line

[RedRobin]

^^^^
Tragically no surprises then!

Dispatches is a good prog, well presented.

When you consider what proportion of the whole UK 'purse' goes on MOD spending and the current state of the economy, it's outrageous.

As I've said before, I am against UK troops being in Afghanistan at all but I absolutely support them (you included!) being looked after in every way possible. Fecking politicians never seem to consider the guys on the front line.

[tony_danza]

Anything that involves private business doing work for public money is usually corrupt and wasteful. Any sector.

I don't expect any surprises, just a lot of facepalming.

[stealthwolf]

Anything that involves private business doing work for public money is usually corrupt and wasteful.

There's a huge amount of this with the NHS and PFIs.

[Janner_Sy]

We dont all waste money,  

Alot of the electrical and mechanical designs we've produced for places like camp bastion and KAF have cost a millions in materials and labour etc, but we go through a horrendous amount of effort to ensure cost effectiveness, and low long term running costs in anything we produce.  

be interesting to see it though.  Some of the civilian contractrs that we employ charge extortionate prices to work out in afghan in the safety of the bases.  So much so that i could leave my job now, and earn over double my annual income and not have to pay tax on it either

[vRS Carl]

We dont all waste money,  

Your not part of MOD procurement either. 

[Janner_Sy]

we have our own procurement system with specific retailers who we have made contracts with.   obviously a much smaller scale than the overall procurement system  

but i see what you mean, this is going to be aimed at the massive wastes in all the vehicle/aircraft procurement systems.  Were small fish compared to that.

[Janner_Sy]

thats just highlighted what everybody already knew TBH.  the Army is top heavy, and the decision makers for procurement all have an agenda for future job prospects, and the eurofighter is a waste of money.  especially as they bought a load of fighter jet varients instead of bombers, so had to pay again to modify them.

ive heardsome intersting comments about this defence reviews though, so im keen to see how that pans out.  

[vRS Carl]

I've said for ages now we have far too many brigadiers upwards.

3/4 of them do feck all aswell but still get paid more than £95k a year

I loved the quote though:

"the analysis that goes into it makes the notes on the back of a fag packet look detailed"

[RedRobin]

.
So what was the prog like? I missed it as I was in the recording studio half the night (with a hot girl singer.. How awful!  )

[vRS Carl]

I thought it was good and well presented.

Didn't reveal anything i didn't know but would be a surprise to the Public.

[QD MBE]

Working within the Joint Helicopter Command, the programme did not come as a surprise to me either. SDSR awaits.......

[DaveB@Vagbremtechnic]

Mk3 Chinook   Fahooking Criminal

Are you sitting comfortably .....then I'll begin.....

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/39182-chinook-still-hitting-back-3-merged.html

[Hedge]

Any chance of a summary Dave as that thread is 346 pages 

[DaveB@Vagbremtechnic]

Certainly......NAO report summary below - bought in 2001 hangared for nearly 10 years before having them reduced to a bare airframe and being fully rewired/replumbed by the other military hangers on namely qinetic at Boscombe at zillions per airframe

Executive Summary
 

National Audit Office Value for Money Report
The Ministry of Defence (the Department) operates a fleet of 40 Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters, primarily in support of Army and special operations. In 1995 the Department ordered 14 Chinook Mk2a helicopters from Boeing of which six were retained as Mk2a and have flown satisfactorily since they were delivered. The other eight, however, were modified as Mk3 to meet a longstanding requirement for dedicated helicopters for special operations. Those eight Chinook Mk3 helicopters cost some £259 million and the Department took delivery of them from Boeing in December 2001. Although Boeing met its contractual obligations, the avionics software fell short of United Kingdom military airworthiness standards and the helicopters have not flown on operations.

In 2004, the Committee of Public Accounts described the original procurement of the Chinook Mk3 Helicopter as “one of the worst examples of equipment procurement” that it had seen. This report follows on from the Committee’s concerns and examines whether the Department has taken appropriate steps to make the eight Chinook Mk3s operational. Our methodology is set out at Appendix 1.


The decision making process


There was no immediate solution on how the Chinook Mk3 helicopters could be made operational. In September 2004 the Department identified a “Fix to Field” project as the best value for money solution. This project involved replacing or modifying the cockpit display and other systems, which would deliver more capable helicopters for special operations. It would also reduce shortfalls in helicopter lift by freeing up Mk2/2a helicopters that had been modified to deliver the special operations capability in the interim.
The Department began a preparation phase for the Fix to Field solution in September 2004, and the project was estimated to deliver in-service helicopters in 2008. In the end it took 30 months for the Department and Boeing to agree an affordable programme of work. Although the preparation phase was protracted, it did result in a robust business case with which to take the project forward. The final estimate for the in-service date was 2011-12 with a predicted cost of £215 million.


Change of strategy – the general shortage of helicopters


The delay in making these Chinooks airworthy contributed to the overall shortfall in helicopter lift and meant that the Department had a smaller Chinook fleet from which to provide capability in Afghanistan. Assuming an appropriate level of pilots and logistic support, additional Chinook flying hours could have been used to carry out operations with greater flexibility including more non-essential military tasks in support of the international mission in Afghanistan.

In July 2006 the Department announced that the number of troops stationed in Afghanistan would be increased from 3,500 to 4,000 and in January 2007 the number was increased to 7,700. As a matter of urgency, the Department began to search for ways to increase significantly the levels of helicopter capability available to commanders in operational theatres, especially in Afghanistan.

The Chinook is the most capable support helicopter in the adverse hot and high conditions of Afghanistan. In March 2007 the Department therefore decided to make the eight Mk3 Chinooks available for operations as soon as possible. The Fix to Field project was cancelled in favour of converting (or “reverting”) the Mk3 to the Mk2/2a standard. The Department estimated that the Reversion project would make them available for operations two years earlier than the Fix to Field project. In March 2007 the Department also purchased six Merlin helicopters for use in Iraq.

The need for more helicopters in Afghanistan and elsewhere was recognised and the decision to cancel the Fix to Field project and revert the Chinook Mk3 was undertaken quickly. The timescale imperative meant that the Department undertook limited analysis of the operational benefits and drawbacks, and the costs and risks of this decision. However, detailed Business Cases were subsequently prepared and approved in accordance with the Department’s regular approvals processes before the main contract was signed in December 2007.

The Department and Boeing are confident that the Reversion project can deliver the additional operational capability by 2009-10. They have, for example, adopted fast track procurement arrangements and, building on the earlier investment in the Fix to Field project, developed a safety management plan, agreed by Boeing, which is expected to deliver an airworthy helicopter. In March 2007, the cost of Reversion was estimated at £53 million. The Department acknowledged at that time that the estimate was immature and had been produced quickly. By the time the Department had developed a mature estimate in November 2007, the cost estimate had risen to £90.1 million (an increase of 70 per cent). This excludes £22.5 million of specific equipment required for Afghanistan funded by the Treasury from the Contingency Reserve.

Since 2002, the Department has met the needs for demanding very low light special operations by using Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters modified with a Night Enhancement Package. The ergonomics of the modified cockpit are imperfect and, while the Department is content that the modified Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters are safe to fly, it accepts that there are safety and operating risks associated with the Night Enhancement Package. The Department has partially mitigated these risks. As part of the latest equipment planning round the Department has earmarked funding to introduce an enhanced partial digital cockpit across the entire Chinook fleet to address these concerns, maintain commonality and increase operational flexibility. The Department expects the enhanced Chinooks for special operations to start to enter service early in the next decade, sooner than under the Fix to Field project. The full special operations capability, using the Chinook Mk3 helicopters “fat” fuel tanks, will be met but later than planned under the Fix to Field project. The costs of the project are commercially sensitive as negotiations are on going.


Conclusions


Our conclusions on the progress of the project are:

The Department’s progress up to the point of committing to reversion in March 2007 on the Chinooks and how they could be made operational was protracted. As a result the shortage of helicopters to support operations has been exacerbated.  Had the Department progressed the Fix to Field project more quickly the Reversion project would have been unnecessary.

The Department’s decision to revert the Chinook Mk3 helicopters will make them available, to meet the overriding priority for additional helicopter lift, two years earlier than would have been the case under the Fix to Field project and will result in a largely common cockpit across the fleet with consequent improvements in operational flexibility. The Department expects this will also result in a lower level of support costs.

Although the Department has met the needs for special operations by adapting Chinook Mk2/2a helicopters the solution has been sub-optional. Early in the next decade, to solve the risks associated with the cockpit ergonomics of the Night Enhancement Package, the Department plans to introduce an enhanced partially digital cockpit across the Chinook fleet, which will enable the prosecution of special operations with greater flexibility and less operational risk.

The timescale imperative meant that the March 2007 decision to revert the Chinook Mk3 helicopters, whilst informed by a high level consideration of options, was not based on the level of detailed analysis that we would usually expect to see for an investment of this magnitude. The project has subsequently passed through the Department’s regular approvals process.

The total costs associated with the Chinook Mk3 helicopters from their initial procurement through to completion of the Reversion project will be some £422 million (Figure 1) some £85 million less than the Fix to Field project. This figure does not however include further expenditure required to sustain the Night Enhancement Package which is currently being negotiated with industry and is therefore commercially sensitive.